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Abstract 
 
The call for a congestion charge is getting louder and more frequent in many countries as 
major metropolitan areas experience increasing levels of road congestion. This is often 
accompanied by a recognition that governments need to find new sources of revenue to 
maintain existing road networks and to invest in new transport infrastructure. Although 
reform of road pricing is almost certain to occur at some time in the future in a number of 
countries, a key challenge is in selling the idea to the community of road users as well as a 
whole raft of interest groups that influence the views of society and politicians. Simply 
announcing a need for a congestion charge (often misleadingly called a tax) does little to 
progress the reform agenda. What is required is a carefully structured demonstration of what 
might be done to progressively introduce adjustments in road user charges that are seen as 
reducing the costs to motorists while ensuring no loss of revenue to government. In this paper 
we show, in the context of Sydney (Australia), that this can be achieved by the reform of 
registration fees in the presence of a distance-based charging regime that can deliver financial 
gains to motorists, with prospects of revenue growth to the State Treasury.  
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Introduction 
 
Road pricing reform is much touted by economists and others who see the current charging 
instruments inadequate in both delivering efficient outcomes for road use (especially in 
controlling levels of traffic congestion), as well as raising sufficient revenue to fund new 
infrastructure and much needed maintenance of existing road networks (see Verhoef et al. 
2008, Manville and King 2012, and Small 1992). The literature is clear about the welfare 
impacts of road pricing as a first best solution, and the impact of compensatory schemes for 
drivers with budgetary neutral packages (e.g., De Borger and  Mayeres 2007; Proost and Van 
Dender 2001). However this literature does not address the greatest challenge in reforming 
road user charges, which is not about welfare impacts but about devising a scheme which 
gains public acceptance.  The benefits of such a scheme must be convincing to voters, 
convincing to politicians concerned about their electoral future (see Marcucci et al. 2005, 
Goodwin 1989, Hensher and Bliemer 2012, Bliemer et al. 2009, Hensher et al. 2013) and 
satisfy the Treasury1. The public sentiment, albeit often misinformed, is well illustrated by 
the following summary of a recent radio conversation. 
Setting: ABC Sydney Radio 702 Tuesday 4 Oct 2011 8.30-8.55am. 
Hensher discusses the merits of Road Pricing Reform (after stating 
clearly that it is more than a congestion tax, and to please stop using the 
emotive language of a congestion TAX). Calls are invited from the public. 
A plumber calls and says (paraphrase): “…I spend up to 5 hours on the 
roads every day between jobs and now you are telling me I have to pay a 
congestion tax on top of all of my existing costs for the 5 hours. What is 
he thinking (the Professor needs to get real)… I do not earn enough 
income now as it is.” 
Hensher’s response (paraphrased): “…I made it very clear I thought that 
the aim is to reform the entire set of charges (including registration fees) 
and to set the kilometre based charges to reflect the traffic conditions 
with the aim of not only enabling you to save time (which is money as 
well) but to give you realistic options on levels of charge and time of day 
to travel. It is expected that you will spend less time travelling and can 
convert such saved time into more productive income earning time.” 
 
This paper promotes the belief that road pricing reform will be achieved only by a slow but 
progressive set of steps in situations where a ‘trial’ is not put in place that allows motorists to 
see its merits (Schuitema et al. 2010). The predominant interest of car drivers, when first 
asked about congestion charges, is what it will mean financially to them (with rare reference 
to its value in improving travel times) as evidenced by referendums in the UK which failed to 
support congestion pricing packages (Gaunt et al. 2007, De Borger and Proost 2012). Indeed, 
in identifying congestion charging schemes that voters would opt for, the literature identifies 
                                                          
1 Politicians in countries we are familiar with are heavily influenced by the flow of revenues to government, and 
Treasuries frequently remind their Minister about this. So from a political perspective, this is paramount. 
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that support is influenced by the perception of societal benefits, but the impact of personal 
well-being is stronger (Jaensirisak et al. 2003. Eliasson and Jonsson 2011). The paper is 
therefore predicated on the idea that reform must start with some initiative that has an easier 
staged sell in respect of the “hip pocket” rather than with the explicit end objective to reduce 
traffic congestion, if it is to achieve acceptance and buy-in.  
The paper is organised as follows. We begin with a discussion of how registration fees can be 
packaged with peak2 distance-based charges to obtain financial gains to key stakeholders3. 
This is followed by an explanation of the method we have adopted, together with the data we 
have used from the Sydney Household Travel Survey data (expanded to the population), to 
undertake scenario analysis in determining the financial and usage implications of varying 
registration fees and distance-based charges in the peak. We then present compelling 
evidence to show how road pricing reform can make both drivers and government better off 
financially, although we recognise that the need for some upfront investment in the data 
capture technology may involve a significant outlay by government. The conclusions 
summarise the main policy implications and topics requiring further research. 
 
Registration-Usage Pricing Reform 
 
Whether any proposed road pricing reform begins with a driver-wide compulsory application 
or a voluntary opt in and opt out plan is secondary to establishing if there is financial merit in 
a scheme in terms of its impact on drivers. In addition to motorists, government, and 
especially Treasuries, also have a keen concern for the revenue implications of road pricing 
reform.  The approach we propose in this paper is to start with a budgetary constraint that 
represents the need for Treasury to be financially no worse off (and possibly better off) while 
establishing a charging regime that will also make drivers, on average, financially no worse 
off (and possibly better off). The Treasury of interest is a State organisation which does not 
collect fuel excise (a federal tax), but collects registration fees. We recognise that in some 
countries such as the UK, the collection agency is at the National level, whereas in Australia 
and the USA, for example, there is the distinction between State and Federal agencies. There 
will be implications for fuel excise which is a Federal responsibility in Australia.  The 
implications for fuel excise revenue is not central to this paper, lying as it does outside the 
reforms proposed, but could easily be included in this framework if a national agency 
perspective is sought. 
 
                                                          
2 We also investigated all day distance-based charging, and while there may be some merits for this, including 
the view that the perception of an all day charge might look better as it is less at (3) cents per km, on balance we 
believe that it will be more difficult to sell this as the first step, and so we have focussed on peak period only 
distance-based charging.  
3 The appeal of a registration fee reduction is that it is transparent and more clearly linked to the reform of road 
pricing, in a way that makes it easier to gain buy in to a road pricing reform package. A 50 percent reduction in 
the registration fee is likely to be perceived much more as a good deal compared to the same amount being sold 
as a concession on income tax which will amount to a very small percentage. Prospect theory highlights this 
through perceptual conditioning. 
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The reform framework we adopt, as proposed in Hensher and Bliemer (2012) that has these 
desired attributes, involves the introduction of a distance-based charging regime in return for 
a discount on the current annual registration fee, in full or in part. Although governments 
often raise the prospect of increasing the annual registration fee to raise revenue (a recent 
example being the release in December of the New South Wales (NSW) Long Term 
Transport Master Plan (TfNSW 2012)), we would argue that discounting of the registration 
fee can be used as part of a carrot and stick initiative to move to use-related charging to 
relieve a cost burden on motorists, at least in the initial phase of securing buy in to road 
pricing reform. To be able to say that a reform strategy will not make drivers worse off 
financially4 will be a major step forward in dulling the immediate critical response from 
motoring organisations and politicians! A resulting bonus of this reform plan, which is not 
available under a registration only fee regime, given the disconnection with kilometres 
travelled, is drivers enjoy the resulting travel time savings. The reduction in kilometres 
travelled, especially during peak periods, need not be radical in order to make enough of a 
difference in traffic congestion. The best evidence of this is the difference between peak 
period travel times on roads during school holidays and during normal times of the year, 
typically associated in Sydney with up to five percent less traffic (or 1 in 20 vehicles) as a 
conservative estimate5. 
Sourcing Data to Quantify the Potential Cost and Revenue Impacts of 
the Reform Plan 
 
The primary data on car driver trip activity and cost outlays is sourced from the Sydney 
Household Travel Survey (HTS), the largest and most comprehensive source of personal 
travel data for the Sydney Greater Metropolitan Area. The HTS was first conducted in 
1997/98 and has been running continuously since then. About 5,000 randomly selected 
households are approached each year to participate in the survey 6 . The sample of the 
                                                          
4 Some individuals may be (slightly) worse off financially even though most will be better off. Some form of a 
compensation package may have merit in such circumstances, with monies coming from the additional revenue 
gain beyond the revenue neutral outcome for Treasury. See also Levinson (2010). 
5 Based on data from the Sydney annual Household Travel Survey and 
http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/publicationsstatisticsforms/downloads/travelspeeds_sydney_metro_area.html 
During school holidays, traffic lightens by about 7 to 10 percent outside school drop off hours, yet the influence 
that this has on traffic flow is immense. (See http://www.privatefleet.com.au/congestion/). The National Road 
and Motorists Association (NRMA) of Australia uses a rule of thumb that when traffic on congested roads falls 
by 5 per cent, speeds increase about 50 per cent (though this might only mean an average speed increase from 
20 km/h to 30 km/h).See http://smh.drive.com.au/roads-and-traffic/how-do-you-spell-the-end-of-the-school-
holidays-gridlock-20120715-224ag.html. We calculated a 4.77 percent drop in traffic volumes during school 
holidays in Sydney in 2005 on all the major arterial roads, freeways and tollroads (sourced from 
 http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/trafficinformation/downloads/aadtdata_dl1.html.) 
6 The HTS consists of a face-to-face interview survey carried out every day from July to June of each financial 
year. This collection method ensures high data quality and maximises response rates. A simple travel diary is 
used by each householder to record the details of all travel undertaken for their nominated 24-hour period. An 
interviewer then interviews each householder to collect the details of each trip. The interviewer records the 
mode of travel, trip purpose, start and end location, and time of departure and arrival. Vehicle occupancy, toll 
roads used and parking are recorded for private vehicle trips and fare type and cost for public transport trips. 
The HTS sampling method was designed for BTS by the Statistical Consultancy section of the Australian 
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continuous HTS is designed on a three-yearly cycle, so that the pooling of three years of data 
gives a sample size similar to that achieved in the traditional once in 10 years metropolitan 
household interview survey. 
 
We have used pooled data of residents of occupied private dwellings in the Sydney 
Metropolitan Area from five waves, June 2007 to October 2011, weighted to the June 30 
2010 population. Population weights are based on the estimated resident population as at 30 
June 2010. The data is based on an average day, and is scaled up to the full year. We have 
undertaken all of the analysis at the geographical level of the Sydney Statistical Division 
(SSD)7. There are 14 SSD’s in Sydney; however we have excluded the Statistical Division of 
Gosford Wyong (SSD7), which is unlikely to be exposed directly to road pricing reform8 
since it is over 65 kilometres north of what is generally regarded as the Sydney region (see 
Figure 1). 
 
In designing a scenario-based application framework, we need to identify the ‘before’ or 
status quo financial outlays and kilometres travelled by drivers in the peak and off-peak 
periods. Some costs are use-related, such as fuel costs (distinguishing the fuel excise from the 
other fuel costs passed to motorists), and tolls, while the registration fees are annual fixed 
charges unrelated to usage. We also need to calculate the revenue obtained by State Treasury 
under the status quo situation. In this study we are interested in the revenue implications for 
the State (of NSW) Treasury who collect registration fees only, and who will, under a 
distance-based charging regime, also collect the use-related revenue. Fuel excise is collected 
by the Federal government and is disbursed as they see fit, with some of the funds returning 
to the States in many forms. Tolls are collected by the tollroad operators and are retained as 
part of the public-private partnership concession arrangements, and are not available to State 
Treasuries. The tollroad network in Sydney is extensive by the standards of most cities (see 
Li and Hensher 2010). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) such that the relative standard error (RSE) decreases and the statistical reliability 
increases as more waves of data are pooled. 
7 We have data at the postcode level which is at a greater level of spatial disaggregation; and while it is useful 
for studying sources of systematic variation that influence total kilometres travelled per driver, there are sample 
reliability concerns for the analysis undertaken herein. We use SSDs, but undertake some additional scenario 
analysis to assess the range of annual kilometres of drivers from each SSD. 
8 There may be implications for residents of Gosford-Wyong who commute to the other Sydney SSDs; however 
this can, in future analysis, be included if required. 
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Figure 1 The location of the 14 SSD’s in Sydney 
To determine the behavioural response of car drivers, expressed in terms of changes in peak 
and off peak kilometres, to the introduction of peak period distance-based charges (DBC)9, 
we need to assume a DBC elasticity of kilometres travelled, ceteris paribus. Li and Hensher 
(2013) provides one review of the evidence, although they find that the focus of most road 
pricing studies that have reported elasticity estimates has not been in terms of changes in 
kilometres travelled. Hensher et al. (1992), in a longitudinal study of household demand for 
automobile by type and kilometres travelled in Sydney, obtained static and dynamic short run 
                                                          
9 It is often suggested that the same outcome for motorists can be achieved by simply reducing the registration 
fee, and increasing fuel taxes. We do not support this view, given that fuel excise is a sum per litre of fuel that is 
essentially independent of the specific kilometres of travel. The idea of specific kilometres (and its link to 
locations and times of the day) is focussed on relating travel to sources and magnitudes of externalities such as 
traffic congestion and emissions (Hensher and Bliemer 2012), and it has been well established that energy based 
taxes fail to deal adequately with traffic congestion problems (Greene 2011). We do, however, acknowledge that 
there is a link between variations in fuel consumed per kilometre and specific kilometres, but not enough to 
influence the evidence presented in this paper. 
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and long price elasticities for fuel and registration charges in the context of annual kilometres 
travelled. We have drawn on this study to select price arc elasticities of -0.25 and -0.35 
respectively for peak and off-peak kilometres, which we suggest are generally in line with 
expert opinion10. Sensitivity testing around these mean estimates enables us to determine the 
influence these estimates have on the change in kilometres travelled. These elasticities are 
applied to the fuel and toll costs 11  together with a peak period distance-based charge, 
assuming no change in total status quo kilometres. Formulae were developed to calculate the 
peak kilometres under a peak only DBC12: 
 
PKMAEC = [PKMBEC*(1-(((TCA|TKMBEC-RegnA) – (TCSQ-RegnSQ))/ (TCSQ-RegnSQ))  
                  * Abs Elas)] * TKMAEC -TKMBEC*(1-PropPKM)  
 
TCA=RegnA+DBC+FuelCost+(Toll-(Toll*((TKMBefore-TKMAfter)/(TKMBefore))) 
 
where: 
PKMAEC = annual peak kms after the elasticity application 
PKMBEC = annual peak kms before the elasticity application 
RegnSQ = annual registration fee before (i.e., status quo) reforms 
RegnA = annual registration fee after reforms 
TCSQ= total costs before (i.e., status quo) reforms  
TCA = total costs after reforms 
TKMBefore = total annual kms after DBC but holding kms to SQ levels  
Abs Elas = the direct elasticity without sign 
PropPKM = proportion of total kms that are peak kms. 
 
Table 1 summarises the kilometre activity of motorists resident in each SSD together with the 
mean personal income, as background to the setting where the extent of changes in annual 
kilometres in the peak and off peak periods change in the presence of reforms to the cost of 
owning and using cars is to be identified. As might be expected, the quantum of kilometres of 
residents of each SSD varies significantly, and in large measure is due to location relative to 
the Sydney Central Business District, reflecting the radial-centric nature of Sydney. The data 
has an implied direct elasticity of daily kilometres per driver with respect to distance from the 
CBD of 0.21 (obtained from a linear regression model in which distance to the CBD was 
statistically significant, with a t-value of 3.64, and in which the overall explanation of 
variation (adjusted R2) is 51 percent); hence a 10 percent increase in the average distance to 
the CBD increases average daily kilometres per driver by 2.10 percent, ceteris paribus. 
                                                          
10 We recognise that these elasticities are drawn from a study that focussed on fuel price changes, and that we 
are using these estimates in the absence of elasticities that are specific to a DBC or a registration fee. However 
we would suggest that the range reported and assessed is a good starting position until we have evidence for 
specific costs.  
11  In Sydney, all tolled roads are cashless with electronic tags (ETAGS). ETAGS tend to make payment 
seamless and change the perception of toll payments since the driver is not having to be reminded in the same 
way as having to find cash and stop. This tends to reduce the price sensitivity and brings it closer to the fuel cost 
response. 
12 There is no account taken for changes in travel time. 
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Interestingly, when we add in personal income, retaining distance to the CBD, we find that 
the parameter associated with the natural logarithm of income is not statistically significant 
(t-value of 1.29), but with an implied mean direct elasticity of daily kilometres per driver 
with respect to mean personal income per SSD that is very close to unity (1.03). If distance to 
the CBD is removed from the model, the personal income parameter is negative (-0.85) and 
highly non-significant (t-value of -0.95). At the mean, therefore, there appears to be no 
statistically significant relationship between average daily kilometres per driver and income. 
 
When we use equivalent data at the postcode level, the overall fit of the model is poor, 
(adjusted R2 of 0.027), although both distance from the CBD and personal income, as the 
only variables in the model, are statistically significant with respective t-values of 12.76 and 
11.79. The implied direct elasticity of daily kilometres per driver with respect to distance 
from the CBD is 0.27, not dissimilar to the SSD level evidence of 0.21, and with respect to 
personal income it is 0.15. 
 
We now take a closer look at the combinations of a distance-based charge and discounted 
registration fees that satisfy the budget neutral (or better) requirement of State Treasury, and 
which also deliver no overall financial impost on drivers. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Profile of SSD level Data 
 
 
 
 
 
SSD SSD Name Mean Personal Income StdDev Income Mean Kms per day per driver StDev KmDay perDrv
SSD1 Inner Sydney 62.89 41.07 13.97 21.45
SSD2 Eastern Suburbs 63.38 43.73 17.14 21.75
SSD3 Inner West 56.42 40.86 16.22 22.64
SSD4 Lower Nth Sydney 62.22 44.03 19.5 23.64
SSD5 Central Nth Sydney 59.96 43.24 26.43 31.09
SSD6 Northern Beaches 61.04 43.27 20.5 24.72
SSD8 Central West Sydney 57.28 42.52 22.75 29.03
SSD9 Canterbury-Bankstown 49.66 36.54 17.85 22.91
SSD10 Blacktown 53.43 37.22 28.18 32.59
SSD11 Fairfield-Liverpool 51.42 37.68 25.68 30.25
SSD12 Outer South West 52.87 38.94 18.24 39.63
SSD13 St George Sutherland 57.18 39.56 24.16 28.72
SSD14 Outer West 56.65 39.23 32.86 37.82
SSD SSD Name Drivers
Total kms per day 
per driver Population Total Licence Holders 
SSD1 Inner Sydney 113,525 1,585,942 362,074 178,624
SSD2 Eastern Suburbs 103,756 1,778,382 261,089 173,161
SSD3 Inner West 79,607 1,291,231 195,230 127,167
SSD4 Lower Nth Sydney 136,065 2,653,274 321,383 194,170
SSD5 Central Nth Sydney 186,687 4,934,141 463,330 146,962
SSD6 Northern Beaches 118,165 2,422,390 250,506 211,984
SSD8 Central West Sydney 180,976 4,117,210 360,720 291,151
SSD9 Canterbury-Bankstown 131,798 2,352,592 338,390 212,523
SSD10 Blacktown 129,705 3,655,082 313,057 188,005
SSD11 Fairfield-Liverpool 161,531 4,148,128 386,326 130,943
SSD12 Outer South West 116,234 2,120,108 257,647 171,410
SSD13 St George Sutherland 216,495 5,230,509 465,594 325,089
SSD14 Outer West 161,735 5,314,614 330,454 104,697
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Identifying the Preferred Mix of a Peak Period Distance-based Charge 
and Discounted Annual Registration Fee 
 
To establish the financial implications of alternative combinations of a peak period DBC and 
discounted annual registration fees, we built a scenario decision support system (in Excel). 
The key inputs, for each SSD and status quo (i.e., before) situation, are the mean annual 
kilometres, the proportion of kilometres in the peak periods (AM and PM)13, the average 
daily cost per driver (comprising fuel and tolls, distinguished by peak and off peak periods), 
annual registration fees, and mean direct elasticities of peak and off peak kilometres with 
respect to usage costs. In addition, for the reform scenarios, we considered a DBC varying 
from 2c/km to 10c/km in the peak, and allowed annual registration fees to vary from 30 to 75 
percent of the status quo annual fee. These ranges were determined from an initial assessment 
of likely adjustments that would satisfy the binding constraints to be neutral to government 
revenue and driver cost outlays.  
 
As part of scenario definition, given the absence of any evidence on cross elasticities of 
kilometre switching by time of day under a move from a fixed annual registration fee to a 
DBC use-related charge, we have assumed that all kilometres that have moved from the peak 
period do not move to the off-peak14. This is a limiting assumption, with an expectation that 
we have under-predicted the change in off-peak kilometres (Bliemer et al. 2009). If we had 
allowed for some of peak kilometres to switch to the off peak, then the financial cost of these 
kilometres would be the same as before, with a possible small reduction on fuel costs given 
the different traffic conditions. Since the off-peak kilometres do not have a DBC cost 
element, the impact on State Treasury is zero; although there is a reduction in Federal fuel 
excise for kilometres no longer undertaken. In the absence of evidence on cross elasticities, 
we speculate that the majority of the previous peak kilometres will move to the off peak 
shoulders, with a small amount being curtailed, and very little switching to public transport 
(given the Sydney situation). 
 
The decision support system calculates the status quo total costs and kilometres for all drivers 
and revenue to State Treasury, distinguishing outlays and receipts for the peak and off peak 
periods. We then introduce the range of peak-period DBCs and discounted registration fees, 
and calculate the combination of these two cost outlays for motorists of each SSD that results 
in both a reduced mean cost outlay to motorists and no loss in revenue to State Treasury. At 
the SSD level, we expect to obtain different DBC levels for a given discount on the 
registration fee, and indeed that is what was obtained. The range is three to eight cents/km. as 
shown in Figure 2. Taking the lowest value would ensure net gains to each SSD motorist, but 
would result in the loss of neutrality (or better) to Treasury revenue. Placing different charges 
on motorists over the metropolitan area would raise clear concerns from many perspectives, 
including the political ramifications. 
                                                          
13 The peak is defined as 6.31am to 9.30 am and 3.01pm to 6pm Monday to Friday. 
14 When we introduced an all day DBC, we would also get a change in off-peak kilometres, but that scenario is 
not considered in this paper. 
10 
 
 
A preferred solution is to take a system wide approach (essentially a weighted averaging of 
the SSD data), and to identify a single DBC, given a discounted registration fee, that achieves 
the required financial outcomes for drivers and State Treasury. Table 2 summarises the 
findings in which the selected peak period DBC is 5c/km with a discounted registration fee of 
$185, slightly greater than a 50 percent reduction.  On average, a driver saves $9 per annum 
and Treasury gains $32 per driver per annum. These are extremely low amounts per driver, 
but they translate into sizeable financial gains to all drivers (Figure 3) and State Treasury 
(Figure 4 and Table 3). Figure 3 highlights the total mean differences in cost outlays for 
drivers resident in each of the SSDs, with eight SSDs having positive gains and five SSD’s 
with negative gains. There is a total cost gain of $43.6m and a total cost loss of $28.8m. 
When converted to an additional cost outlay per driver per km, the amount for the five 
affected SSDs is 0.34 cents/km, contrasted with 0.65 cents/km gain for the eight SSDs. 
 
In exploring the financial implications on drivers of moving away from an SSD-specific DBC 
solution, Table 4 is particularly informative in that it identifies the average gains or losses in 
cost outlays per driver per annum in each SSD. The bolded cells represent the preferred 
outcome when each SSD is assessed independently; and this is contrasted with the cells based 
on the system wide 5 cents/km solution. For SSD’s 5 and 13, the SSD-specific and system 
wide DBC charge is the same. The evidence in Table 4 suggests that, on average, car drivers 
are better off under the system wide DBC than under the SSD-specific solution for SSDs 1-4, 
6, 8-9, and SSD 12, but Treasury is worse off; and worse off for SSDs 10 and 11, with 
Treasury better off. The average annual financial gains and losses per driver at 5 cents/km are 
relatively small, ranging from $91 for SSD1 to -$40 for SSD10. Of the SSDs located the 
furthest distance from the CBD (notably SSDs 10-14), drivers are better off under the 5 c/km 
DBC in SSD8 and SSD12, whereas in the other SSDs drivers are worse off, with annual cost 
outlay increases varying from a high of $84 (SSD14 - Outer West) to a low of  $3 (SSD13 – 
St George Sutherland). These are still, however, very small financial imposts on drivers. 
Importantly, however, as shown above, there appears to be no evidence of an income effect 
as a consequence of moving from SSD-specific DBCs to a system wide DBC. 
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Figure 2 A Comparison of the System wide DBC versus SSD Specific Pricing 
 
Table 2 Identifying a DBC and Discounted Registration Fee that makes Motorists and Treasury Financially No 
Worse Off 
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Figure 3 Impact of Pricing Reform on Annual Costs of Driver per SSD 
 
Figure 4 Impact of Pricing Reform on Treasury Revenue 
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Table 3 Impact of Pricing Reform on Treasury Revenue per Driver and for all Drivers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SSD SSD Name
Treasury 
Impact 
Peak PA
Annual Net Revenue 
Peak
SSD1 Inner Sydney -68 -7,690,883
SSD2 Eastern Suburbs -31 -3,184,248
SSD3 Inner West -36 -2,885,496
SSD4 Lower Nth Sydney -3 -428,670
SSD5 Central Nth Sydney 80 15,002,723
SSD6 Northern Beaches 3 412,293
SSD8 Central West Sydney 40 7,202,676
SSD9 Canterbury-Bankstown -16 -2,157,321
SSD10 Blacktown 93 12,001,333
SSD11 Fairfield-Liverpool 65 10,432,742
SSD12 Outer South West -16 -1,851,350
SSD13 St George Sutherland 46 10,043,318
SSD14 Outer West 145 23,453,308
All SSDs 302 60,350,423
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Table 4 Summary of SSD-Specific Optimal DBC compared to the Systemwide 5c/km Impact 
Note: The red shaded cells represent gains to motorists and Treasury 
 
 
Importantly, the new reform package results in a 4.7 percent reduction in total annual peak 
period kilometres, and a 2.96 percent reduction in all kilometres15 (given in Table 5 and 
                                                          
15 We recognise that this will likely be smaller when trips moving to off-peak periods are considered. It is of 
course true, that if motorists have similar total outlays before and after but travel less km, then the average cost 
per km travelled must increase. This means, as a referee has pointed out, that the decrease in costs to motorists is 
essentially a function of the decrease in kilometres driven. When taking account of fuel costs, if the peak 
kilometres all move to the off peak then the cost outcome is more or less unchanged (noting marginally lower 
fuel costs under less congested condition in the off peak). We have not introduced the possibility of some 
kilometres being moved to the off peak or switching to public transport, and nor have we accounted for the 
public transport fare or any possible loss of value associated with trips eliminated. 
DBC for peak kms only
Pos=gain, neg = loss
Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km
2 164 -154 -56 151 -139 -72 153 -141 -75 141 -128 -83
3 139 -125 -84 120 -102 -108 124 -106 -113 106 -85 -125
4 115 -96 -113 90 -66 -144 95 -71 -151 71 -43 -167
5 91 -68 -141 60 -30 -180 66 -36 -188 37 -3 -208
6 68 -40 -169 32 4 -215 39 -3 -226 4 37 -250
7 45 -13 -197 3 38 -251 12 30 -264 -28 77 -292
8 23 14 -225 -24 72 -287 -14 62 -301 -59 115 -333
9 2 40 -253 -50 104 -323 -39 93 -339 -90 152 -375
10 -19 66 -281 -76 136 -359 -64 123 -377 -119 189 -416
DBC for peak kms only
Pos=gain, neg = loss
Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km
2 113 -93 -124 139 -125 -88 127 -110 -113
3 64 -34 -186 103 -82 -133 85 -60 -170
4 17 23 -248 67 -39 -177 45 -10 -227
5 -30 80 -311 32 3 -221 5 38 -283
6 -75 135 -373 -2 43 -265 -34 86 -340
7 -119 189 -435 -35 83 -310 -71 132 -397
8 -162 242 -497 -67 123 -354 -108 177 -453
9 -204 293 -559 -98 161 -398 -143 221 -510
10 -244 344 -621 -128 198 -442 -177 263 -567
DBC for peak kms only
Pos=gain, neg = loss
Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km
2 147 -133 -86 109 -89 -125 118 -100 -118
3 114 -94 -128 58 -28 -188 72 -44 -177
4 82 -55 -171 8 32 -251 26 10 -236
5 51 -18 -214 -40 90 -313 -18 64 -295
6 21 19 -257 -88 148 -376 -61 116 -353
7 -9 55 -300 -134 204 -439 -103 167 -412
8 -37 91 -342 -179 259 -501 -143 217 -471
9 -65 125 -385 -222 312 -564 -183 265 -530
10 -92 158 -428 -264 365 -627 -221 313 -589
DBC for peak kms only
Pos=gain, neg = loss
Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km Car driver Treasury
change in 
peak km
2 146 -133 -80 124 -107 -113 91 -67 -152
3 113 -94 -120 81 -55 -169 31 5 -228
4 81 -55 -161 38 -4 -225 -27 75 -304
5 49 -17 -201 -3 46 -281 -84 143 -380
6 19 21 -241 -43 95 -338 -139 211 -456
7 -11 57 -281 -82 143 -394 -193 276 -532
8 -41 93 -321 -120 189 -450 -245 340 -608
9 -69 128 -361 -157 235 -507 -296 403 -684
10 -96 162 -402 -193 279 -563 -345 464 -760
SSD4
Outer SW StGSuth Outer West
CantBnk BlackTwn FairLivP
SSD12 SSD13 SSD14
Cent Nsyd Nth Bch CentWSyd
SSD9 SSD10 SSD11
SSD5 SSD6 SSD8
LowNSydInnSyd EastSub InnWest
SSD1 SSD2 SSD3
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Figure 5 for each SSD and overall for all SSDs). This percentage change of close to 5 percent 
in the peak is in line with evidence on what it takes to get a noticeable improvement in levels 
of traffic congestion, which are often associated with the reduced traffic during school 
holidays (see footnote 4 which reports a 4.77 percent drop in traffic volumes during school 
holidays in Sydney in 2005). Hence if the reform package of a combination of a peak period 
DBC of 5c/km is combined with a discounted registration fee of $185 on average, we can 
expect noticeable improvements in traffic congestion, without a cost hike to motorists or a 
revenue loss to State Treasury. There will, however, be an overall 2.96 percent loss in fuel 
excise to the Federal government. 
Table 5 Impact of Pricing Reform on Annual Kilometres 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Impact of Pricing Reform on Total Driver Kilometres per SSD 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
SSD
Total Daily 
Peak Kms 
Before
Total Daily Peak 
Kms - Peak DBC, 
50%Rego
Total Daily 
Off peak Kms 
Before
Total Daily 
OffPk Kms - 
Peak DBC, 
50%Rego
Total Daily 
Kms Before
Tot Daily Kms - 
Peak DBC, 
50%Rego
Inner Sydney 960,137 915,997 625,805 625,805 1,585,942 1,541,802
Eastern Suburbs 1,100,758 1,047,854 677,624 677,624 1,778,382 1,725,478
Inner West 819,932 779,731 471,299 471,299 1,291,231 1,251,030
Lower Nth Sydney 1,661,215 1,579,473 992,059 992,059 2,653,274 2,571,532
Centra l  Nth Sydney 3,175,539 3,021,395 1,758,602 1,758,602 4,934,141 4,779,997
Northern Beaches 1,480,543 1,414,676 941,847 941,847 2,422,390 2,356,523
Centra l  West Sydney 2,653,106 2,526,716 1,464,105 1,464,105 4,117,210 3,990,821
Canterbury-Bankstown 1,502,772 1,434,478 849,820 849,820 2,352,592 2,284,298
Blacktown 2,282,529 2,185,637 1,372,553 1,372,553 3,655,082 3,558,189
Fairfield-Liverpool 2,596,794 2,474,630 1,551,333 1,551,333 4,148,128 4,025,964
Outer South West 1,327,221 1,267,888 792,886 792,886 2,120,108 2,060,774
St George Sutherland 3,263,618 3,100,803 1,966,891 1,966,891 5,230,509 5,067,694
Outer West 3,345,305 3,190,485 1,969,309 1,969,309 5,314,614 5,159,794
Al l  SSD's 26,169,470 24,939,764 15,434,133 15,434,133 41,603,603 40,373,897
Percent Change -4.70% -2.96%
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The analysis reported so far has been based on the average driver in each SSD. To investigate 
the likely implications on cost outlays and revenue raised of deviations around the mean, we 
have taken the two extremes of all drivers in each SSD having high and low kilometres. The 
relevant levels for each SSD are given in Table 6, and range from a high of 75 kilometres per 
driver per day to a low of 8 kilometres per driver per day, both in the Outer West. Under 
these kilometre assumptions, we find that the peak period DBC is reduced to 2c/km for the 
high kilometres, and increased to 10c/km for the low kilometres, given the same discounted 
registration fee of $185. If all drivers were at the high or low kilometre level, State Treasury 
is financially much better off than under the 5c/km DBC, due to either the greater number of 
kilometres in the peak periods, or the higher DBC. Drivers, however, are worse off if they all 
operated at the high kilometres, while substantially better off at the low kilometres. Clearly 
this evidence is not what will occur in reality, because of a distribution of annual kilometres 
across all drivers. Even with a user loss of $14.076m, that is equivalent to only 2.01 cents per 
day per driver, hardly noticeable! 
Table 6 Implications of High and Low Annual Kilometres in each SSD 
Peak period DBC =2c/km for high kms and 10c/km for low kms 
Annual registration fee is held at the discounted fee of $185 
Positive = savings 
SSD Annual Kilometres 
per driver per day 
 
Change in Driver Costs 
$ per annum per SSD 
Change in Treasury Revenue 
$ per annum per SSD 
 Low High Low Kms High Kms Low Kms High Kms 
Inner Sydney 10 40 5,296,833 7,775,340 -1,500,051 -4,737,915 
Eastern Suburbs 12 45 1,000,505 4,901,139 3,352,227 -1,636,590 
Inner West 12 45 642,193 3,497,667 2,872,721 -861,481 
Lower Nth Sydney 15 65 -5,896,785 -4,007,725 13,197,394 10,334,920 
Central Nth Sydney 12 65 685,461 -6,488,833 7,781,749 15,661,644 
Northern Beaches 10 55 5,420,140 1,430,670 -1,392,256 3,000,003 
Central West Sydney 10 55 7,455,849 649,823 -598,481 6,893,282 
Canterbury-Bankstown 10 50 5,518,786 3,174,935 -611,578 1,732,272 
Blacktown 15 70 -5,537,584 -6,185,996 12,460,972 12,647,825 
Fairfield-Liverpool 12 65 1,488,862 -4,737,450 5,442,874 12,246,831 
Outer South West 9 50 6,902,847 3,137,157 -3,161,920 1,019,429 
St George Sutherland 12 65 2,375,002 -6,199,179 6,854,364 16,197,659 
Outer West 8 75 12,161,459 -11,024,484 -7,483,515 19,795,630 
All SSDs 10 55 37,513,570 -14,076,936 37,214,501 92,293,510 
 
Another way of considering variations in total peak and off peak kilometres is to stay with the 
DBC of 5c/km and to calculate the impost on drivers with high and low kilometres (Table 7). 
Although State Treasury is significantly better off under both low and high kilometres, 
drivers are much better off under low kilometres, but substantially worse off under high 
kilometres, as might be expected. It is clear that if say, 20 percent of all drivers have peak 
kilometres that are much greater than the weighted average for all SSDs, then some 
adjustment down in DBC will be required or a further discount of the registration fee. The 
‘optimal’ DBC of 5c/km is the lowest we can obtain if State Treasury is to be no worse off 
(see Table 2); however if we reduce the registration fee, we may be able to establish a 
possible ‘solution’. A zero registration fee does not work at all for Treasury; a $150 
registration fee will satisfy the Treasury budget constraint at 5c/km (gaining $11 instead of 
$32 per driver per annum) while making drivers better off (gaining $32 compared to $9 per 
annum), but only at a very slightly higher kilometres than the average kilometres. 
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Table 7 Implications of High and Low Annual Kilometres in each SSD 
Peak period DBC =5c/km for high and low kms 
Annual registration fee is held at the discounted fee of $185 
Positive = savings 
SSD Annual Kilometres 
per driver per day 
 
Change in Driver Costs 
$ per annum per SSD 
Change in Treasury Revenue 
$ per annum per SSD 
 Low High Low Kms High Kms Low Kms High Kms 
Inner Sydney 10 40 14,307,805 -15,677,906 -12,409,414 23,271,470 
Eastern Suburbs 12 45 11,036,737 -19,611,823 -8,860,372 27,773,194 
Inner West 12 45 8,340,664 -15,609,974 -6,583,207 22,200,438 
Lower Nth Sydney 15 65 10,631,043 -50,773,151 -6,980,738 66,591,138 
Central Nth Sydney 12 65 19,235,148 -71,886,155 -15,001,543 94,818,182 
Northern Beaches 10 55 14,825,949 -32,313,832 -12,812,007 43,390,513 
Central West Sydney 10 55 22,119,151 -52,916,193 -18,690,467 71,773,956 
Canterbury-Bankstown 10 50 16,176,667 -32,091,947 -13,723,064 44,359,965 
Blacktown 15 70 10,174,725 -54,085,857 -6,713,031 70,240,430 
Fairfield-Liverpool 12 65 17,079,316 -60,165,202 -13,613,448 78,938,656 
Outer South West 9 50 15,427,902 -27,582,892 -13,557,438 37,974,358 
St George Sutherland 12 65 23,019,199 -80,243,178 -18,404,516 105,239,380 
Outer West 8 75 22,857,881 -75,335,331 -20,518,909 97,263,195 
All SSDs 10 55 205,232,187 -588,293,441 -167,868,152 783,834,875 
 
What is emerging from this analysis is that if we can increase the net revenue to Treasury 
substantially, while not making users worse off on average, then we can use the net Treasury 
gains to compensate drivers who have kilometres in excess of the average, possibly limiting 
this to 25 percent or more above the average. As the annual savings are very small per driver 
for users and Treasury (shown in Table 3), an increase in cost, say of $100 per year, amounts 
to a minimal amount per trip. For example, in Table 2, if we had a peak DBC of 10c/km, the 
average cost increase per driver per day would be 46 cents on average, or 2 cents per 
kilometre over all kilometres. The resulting increase in net revenue to State Treasury can then 
be available to compensate high peak kilometre drivers16, and based on the evidence in 
Tables 2 and 3, this could amount to over $60m per annum available for disbursement. A user 
loss of $588.29m is equivalent to 89 cents per day per driver (or $324 per annum), or 3.8 
cents per kilometre, which again is very small! We might suggest, given these very small 
numbers, that a case can be made for a higher DBC above 5c/km, as a way of ensuring 
sufficient additional funds to compensate high peak kilometre drivers. 
Conclusions 
 
The road pricing reform proposal developed in this paper is designed to provide a pathway to 
gaining buy in from the community that is essential to securing the support of the political 
process. With demonstrated evidence in the initial phase of reform that the majority of drivers 
and the State government will not be worse off financially, it is easier to obtain buy in, 
                                                          
16 This will need very careful consideration. It should be fair as well. If high peak km drivers get a lot of 
compensation, they pay much less per km than people that drive below average kilometres. So this would more 
or less mean that the first kms are charged at a higher rate, while the rate diminishes. Does this have the desired 
effect? In the end, high peak km drivers may have less and less incentive to decrease their kilometres driven. 
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regardless of the implications for reduced traffic congestion and faster trips. The real bonus, 
and effective selling point, will occur when drivers see real time savings, and motoring 
associations finally are convinced that their members do gain from such pricing reform.  
 
This is the first study that we are aware of that has systematically investigated a reform 
package that can appeal to key stakeholders, and that places quantitative evidence on the table 
for an entire Metropolitan area. The great majority of well articulated academic and 
consultancy research has generally failed in this endeavour. Indeed a recent comment by 
Poole (2012) best summarises this position: “I’m struck by what seems to be a huge 
disconnect between the systems being modeled by academic economists and the proposals 
emerging from field tests and demonstrations involving actual motorists.” (Poole 2012). There 
are, however, some excellent exceptions, but they relate to cordon-based charging, as in 
Stockholm (Eliassson et al. 2009), or have an environmental focus (Parry 2012). 
 
This road pricing reform plan would require drivers to purchase an on-board unit (OBU) 
(approximately $50 once off cost17) that will record the kilometres by time of day. The off 
peak kilometres are not charged, but peak kilometres will be charged at the agreed cents/km. 
This scenario implies that if an OBU is not installed, all kilometres will be charged as peak 
kilometres, giving an incentive to install a meter (with the expectation that all motorists will 
do so), just like households have had with off peak electricity meters or with water meters 
when they were first introduced. Indeed, linking this to the availability of ‘Pay As You Go’ 
insurance could provide additional benefits to users (Greaves and Fifer 2010, Parry 2012). 
There could be considerable implementation, operating and enforcement costs of a 
metropolitan wide (i.e., all roads) charging system for the state if a state of the art system was 
put in place.  This would upset the revenue/cost balance (and which may require a variation 
in the ‘optimal’ DBC) unless the costs of such implementation can be spread over other 
reforms such as insurance reform. We believe that an additional cent per km may be all that is 
required, at least initially, or a smaller amount of the investment is amortised over say a 10 
year period. This would increase the net revenue to $70m per annum or at least $800m to 
$1bn over 10 years, excluding adjustments for inflation, but factoring in growth in car use. In 
the Sydney context, there is already a system in place to capture data on the tollroads using 
ETAGs which have the capability of capturing time of day kilometres (indeed distance-based 
time of day charging already exists on one of the longer tollroads in Sydney). Technology 
experts advise us that conversion to GPS capture is feasible, if required. 
 
In ongoing research using the same data and analysis framework, the vertical equity 
implications of the road pricing reform scheme is being investigated to identify if low-income 
drivers as a class benefit at least as much as the costs they bear, and that disadvantaged 
residents (including non-drivers) benefit overall. A popular view is that revenues must be 
dedicated to transport improvements to be politically feasible, but some analyses indicate that 
alternative distributions that include broad tax reductions or financial rebates benefit the 
                                                          
17 Based on the expected volume of installations. 
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largest number of citizens, and therefore may be more politically popular (Littman 1996, 
Hensher and Li 2012, King et al. 2007, Levinson 2010). 
 
In the current paper we have focussed on a peak DBC; however we have also considered the 
possibility of an all day DBC, which will be lower than the 5c/km peak charge, optimised at 
3c/km. There are arguments for and against peak versus all day charging. For example, 
charging only in the peak may make some people worse off, especially those that cannot 
avoid the peak period because of fixed working hours, in comparison to others that have 
flexible working hours, although the higher DBC in the peak with no off peak charge may 
result in them being no worse off, given the percentage of all kilometres that are in the peak. 
Clearly, this effect may be increased, subject to the relativity of a peak only and an all day 
DBC, because all revenues need to come from peak hours, such that the peak rate needs to be 
higher, but for Sydney the difference is only 2c/km. As part of ongoing research on the 
vertical equity impacts of the reform package, we are exploring the possibility that, although 
on average, the current paper shows that drivers are no worse off financially under a peak 
DBC, a peak rate only scheme might lead to large differences, where many may be much 
worse off, and many will be much better off. Having an off-peak rate might spread the 
financial impact more, and may not create such equity issues. 
 
This paper has focussed on motorists resident in Sydney, and is designed to move to a more 
efficient use of roads by using the price signal to underpin motorist’s travel behaviour. 
However, there is a good case to extend the reform package to all vehicles, freight and 
passenger, as well as all jurisdictions under the control of a single government (in our case it 
would be New South Wales18). In doing this, vehicles would be more closely paying for the 
damage done to roads.  However, a charge related to damage is likely to be a lower all day 
DBC than is suggested by this paper, and would be similarly replacing an element of 
registration charge when implementing the scheme outside of capital cities where traffic 
congestion is not an issue. When initial reform is bedded down and accepted, a case for 
increasing the DBC may be considered, as a way of raising much needed funding for future 
investment in public transport and roads as a consequence of the diminishing revenue base 
from traditional and more inefficient sources.  
 
Finally, in ongoing research, the next steps involve building in such pricing reforms into an 
integrated land use and transport planning model system so as identify the wider set of 
economic, social and environmental impacts. Specifically, in this paper, there is no valuation 
of the cost to motorists for the kilometres no longer driven. However, lower kilometres driven 
in the peak will benefit from travel time savings (also not included) and those not transferred 
                                                          
18 It is important to note that we are focussing on the Sydney metropolitan area as if it were a closed system. 
There will be a need to consider the entire state of NSW, and to recognise that the DBC may be lower if it is 
defined to capture all externalities as well as cost the road damage. Since congestion is not an issue in regional 
and rural NSW, a lower DBC may have to be considered. If, in addition, government would want a common 
registration fee structure throughout the State, then we would have to recalculate the financial implications on 
Treasury of a lower DBC for rural and regional residents. Visitors to specific locations in NSW would also be 
subject to the pricing reforms, with the same payment paths open to them that are currently offered on tollroads 
in Sydney (i.e., a phone number to call to pay within 24 hours or acquire an ETAG and open an account). 
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to the off-peak which is not charged must have a lower valuation than the marginal cost of 
doing so. In any first best and second best solution that removes kilometres from the system, 
there is likely to be a deadweight loss of this sort.  However, whilst this might be considered 
as a negative effect, we do not claim an economic valuation of the before and after reform.  A 
full economic evaluation would need to balance these negative effects against the positive 
environmental effect and reductions in congestion.  This takes us beyond the scope of the 
paper, which is motivated by and aims to establish an evidence-based approach to a real 
reform of road pricing, to establish a case that has a real chance of getting buy in from 
stakeholders who ultimately determine the possibility of reforms. 
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